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ABSTRACT
 
Digital systems that use redundancy to achieve high reliability -are
 
designed so that they. recover from most failures. The problem of
 
accurate evaluation of the failure tolerance of any particular redundant
 
system is quite difficult. The methods based on general analytical
 
modeling techniques suffer from the need to make simplifying
 
assumptions. Thus, the confidence that can be granted to their results
 
is low. Some techniques use fault-simulation and try to estimate the
 
size of the failure population that causes system crash by simulating a
 
random sample of failures. However, ultra-reliable systems will
 
tolerate most of the failures, so, very many faults need to be simulated
 
to reach an acceptable level of confidence. The method proposed here
 
tries to enumerate all the critical fault-patterns (successive
 
occurrences of failures) without analyzing every single possible fault.
 
From the system description, one can find all the output devices that
 
allow the system to communicate with the outside world. From the
 
description of these output devices, one can find the conditions that
 
must be satisfied for the system to be operating correctly. Also, one
 
can enumerate all the possible operating modes according to their
 
criticality (high, low, or no tolerance to subsequent failures) and list
 
the corresponding conditions. Most highly redundant systems are
 
provided with capabilities to disable some part of the system or , at
 
least, to ignore data coming from them. These constitute switches and
 
they control the system configuration. At any point in time, the list
 
of the faulty units and the actual system configuration give the static
 
state of the system. The conditions for the system to be operating in a
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given mode can be expressed in term of the static states. Thus, one can
 
find all the system states that correspond to a given critical mode of
 
operation. The next step consists in analyzing the fault-detection
 
mechanisms, the diagnosis algorithm and the process of switch control.
 
From them, one can find all the possible system configurations that can
 
result from a failure occurrence. Thus, one can list all the
 
characteristics , with respect to detection, diagnosis, and switch
 
control, that failures must have to constitute critical fault-patterns.
 
Such an enumeration of the critical fault-patterns can be directly used
 
to evaluate the overall system tolerance to failures. Present research
 
is focused on how to efficiently make use of these system-level
 
characteristics to enumerate all the failures, defined at the gate level
 
(for example line i stuck-at-one), that verify these characteristics.
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I. CRITICAL FAILURES AND REDUNDANT SYSTEMS
 
The purpose of using massive redundancy in computer systems is to
 
protect them from the effects of internal failures. When several
 
computers perform the same computations in tight synchronism, it is
 
possible to detect the occurrence of a computer failure by comparing the
 
computer outputs. The -faulty computer is then switched off and it is
 
said that the system has recovered from the failure. As first
 
approximation, one can say that system failure, also referred to as
 
system crash, occurs only when there are not enough fault-free computers
 
left to allow a meaningful comparison. For example, Triple Modular
 
Redundant systems (also called TMR systems) [von Neumann; 1956], Fig.
 
1, fail upon the second failure occurrence: the majority voter will not
 
produce the correct output when two of its inputs are faulty.
 
But even for systems as simple as TMR systems, the actual system
 
behavior in presence of failures is far more complex. Some of the
 
failures that affect the voter, (cf. Fig. 1) cause a system crash; for
 
example, a stuck-at-one failure in the OR gate (line a7 , a8, a9 , or a10
 
stuck-at-one). Also some double failures will be tolerated. For
 
example, if the output of computer 1 (line y1 ) is stuck-at-zero while
 
the output of computer 2 (line y2 ) is stuck-at-one, the system will
 
still operate correctly since the faulty logic one on line Y2
 
compensates for the faulty logic zero on line y1 in the voting process.
 
This phenomenon is known as compensating failures. It was shown in
 
[Siewiorek; 1971] that many double failures are compensating failures
 
and that the actual reliability performance of TMR systems is far better
 
than what is estimated when compensating failures are ignored.
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Fig. 1. T.M.R. Redundant System. 
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For the simple system of Fig. 1 , one can enumerate all single and
 
double failures from which the system does not recover. The uncoverable
 
single and double failures are respectively.the most and-the second most
 
critical failures. For example, the set of uncoverable single failures
 
is:
 
{line a7 s-a-i, line a8 s-a-i, line a9 s-a-l, line a,, s-a-l}.
 
The set of uncoverable double failures is quite large, even for such a
 
simple example. Some simplifications can be obtained if one uses the
 
various relations that exist between failures, for example fault
 
equivalence and fault dominance [Bfoute; 1972].
 
Most actual systems, however, are far more complex than the
 
oversimplified example of Fig. 1. Pure enumeration of all the faults
 
and their classification according to their respective criticality is a
 
prohibitive task. In most redundant systems, the problem of finding the
 
critical failures is further complicated by the fact that each computer
 
has some internal fault-detection mechanisms (self-test programs, parity
 
verification, watchdog timers,...) and some way to disable itself when a
 
fault-detection mechanism gives some error indication. The ability for
 
a computer to detect some of its failures without requiring comparison
 
between several computers greatly improves the overall system
 
reliability but also greatly complicates the system analysis. For each
 
fault one needs to consider the state of the faulty computer (whether
 
the fault was locally detected, correctly diagnosed and the proper
 
reconfiguration steps taken) and also the global state of the system
 
(the decision taken by the fault-free computers and their agreement with
 
the state of the faulty computer).
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II. DESCRIPTION OF THE AIRBORNE ADVANCED RECONFIGURABLE COMPUTER SYSTEM
 
II.1 Introduction
 
The Airborne Advanced Reconfigurable Computer System -the ARCS­
[Bjurman; 19761 is an integrated navigation/guidance/flight control
 
system for commercial aircrafts. The system is a
 
Triplex-to-Duplex-to-Simplex fault-tolerant computing system with the
 
capability to be expanded to a Quadruplex-to-Triplex-to-Duplex-to-

Simplex mode of operation. Fig. 2 shows a block diagram of the ARCS.
 
11.2 Channel Description
 
A channel in the ARCS terminology refers to a computer with its
 
associated sensor and servo equipment. A channel contains all the
 
electronics and the mechanical component to fully implement all the
 
navigation, guidance and flight control operations. Thus, a single
 
channel can fly the aircraft. The ARCS contains three channels (four in
 
the expanded verion).
 
11.2.1 Channel Components
 
The components within each channel are: sensors and mode controls,
 
computer unit, iterative timer and watchdog monitor, servo electronics,
 
servo monitor, and switch and servo actuator.
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11.2.1.1 Sensors and Mode Control
 
These are inputs to the computer unit. The sensors provide data for
 
flight control of the aircraft and the mode controls are instructions
 
given by the pilot to the system.
 
11.2.1.2 Computer Unit
 
The computer unit is the major element of a channel. It is a
 
microprogrammed general purpose 16 bit computer. The instruction set
 
provides for real-time control applications. It has built-in test and
 
self-monitoring features for detecting arithmetic errors, memory and bus
 
errors (by parity checks), and input/output hardware faults (by
 
self-test loops). The major function is the control of the flight of
 
the aircraft. The computer is designed with cross-chanel communication
 
interfaces to implement data links between channels. The use of optical
 
coupling removes the potential dangers associated with electrical
 
coupling.
 
11.2.1.3 Iteration Timing Reference and Watchdog Monitor
 
These are devices independent of the computer unit. Under normal
 
operation, the computers operate in frame synchronous mode where certain
 
computations are performed within a fixed time frame. The end of a time
 
frame is marked by an interrupt from the iteration timing reference.
 
When more than one computer unit are in operation, the synchronization
 
indicator signals generated by each unit in response td the interrupt
 
are examined by other units in other channels. When all syncronization
 
indicators are set all channels will synchronize.. Thus begins a new
 
time frame.
 
The watchdog monitor checks the synchronization signal of the computer
 
unit to determine if it is set and reset within acceptable upper and
 
lower time limits. If not, the monitor will cause the associated servos
 
to be disengaged and the computer unit marked as faulty.
 
The iterative timing reference also serves the purposes of interrupting
 
the computer unit at regular intervals after power-on or any transient
 
fault condition to attempt recovery and of synchronizing with the other
 
units.
 
II.2.1.4 Servo Electronics
 
The servo electronics interface the computer with the servo actuator.
 
In each actuator, the electronics are duplicated and two inputs are
 
required to operate them. This provides the means for electric current
 
comparison (between the servo electonics outputs) for the purpose of
 
self-monitoring.
 
11.2.1.5 Servo Monitor and Switch
 
The servo monitor controls the engage/shut off switch between the servo
 
electronics and the actuator. When a failure is detected by comparison
 
of the output current of the dual servo electronics, or when a signal is
 
received from the watchdog monitor or the computer itself, the servo
 
monitor commands the servo switch to shut off the-servo.
 
11.2.1.6 Servo Actuator
 
The servo actuators are the mechanical/hydraulic output devices of the
 
channels. They produce hydraulic pressures that are used in the force
 
voting devices that position the aircraft flaps.
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11.3 Detection, Diagnosis and Recovery Description
 
The fault-tolerance objective in the design of ARCS- is to provide a
 
system coverage of unity for any first-failure condition in a triplex
 
configuration. Further, a second-failure module coverage of 0.95 or
 
better and a simplex failure-detection probability of-0.90 are design
 
goals for the computer and interfaces modules.
 
Reconfiguration is the process of attempting to tolerate a fault. It
 
consists of the sub-process of fault detection, fault localization,
 
fault isolation, recovery and redundancy degradation. Fig. 3 shows
 
which sub-processes are initiated in response to particular faults, and
 
Fig. 4 gives a description of the ARCS channels that is based upon the
 
detection, diagnosis and reconfiguration processes.
 
11.3.1 Reconfigur9tion for sensor failures
 
Faults that occur in the sensors are monitored by the sensor Signal
 
Selection and Fault Detection (SSFD) algorithm. Sensors are afflicted
 
with a number of error characteristics: bias error, scale factor
 
tolerance, dynamic response tolrance and noise. In ARCS, compensation
 
of these error characteristics is part of the SSFD process.
 
For continuous (non-discrete) signals, comparison between the current
 
compensated input data and the avenage~of the input values from the
 
previous iteration is used to monitor for dynamic faults (rapidly
 
deviating raw signal inputs). Calculations of the bias error for the
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next iteration provide a means-of monitoring static faults. When the
 
bias error reaches a predetermined level, fault is declared. Redundant
 
sensor data (from different channels) are then averaged, and further
 
fault detection is done by comparing these data. For discrete signals,
 
time skews are resolved in the SSFD algorithm. Consistent disagreement
 
of input from one channel with others indicates a fault.
 
The SSFD algorithm thus consolidates redundant sensor data and provides
 
identical data for all computer units. Further computations operate on
 
identical data, and any discrepency between channels in later stages
 
indicates a fault condition.
 
Fault isolation is effected by raising do-not-use flags against faulted
 
sensors on a per-channel basis. If the fault is transient, the input
 
will become acceptable after a time delay and the flag will be removed.
 
If it persists, a permanent fault flag is raised, disconnecting this
 
input from the computations. These are the recovery and redundancy
 
degradation processes for sensor faults, which are part of the SSFD
 
algorithm within the Redundancy Management process.
 
11.3.2 Reconfiguration for computer failures
 
11.3.2.1 Output Monitor
 
The output monitor is a software process that compares, the computed.
 
outputs of a processor with the computed, cross-channel transferred
 
outputs of the other processors. An output monitor flag is set for the
 
affected output if the comparison does not agree within the monitoring
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threshold. In such a case, each channel determines if itself can be
 
faulty. A singl& disgreement in a triplex or- quadruplex mode of
 
operation can be determined immediately.- Otherwise, each channel checks
 
the fault status table for related faults. If such a fault is
 
registered, the associated servo is disengaged and recovery is attempted
 
using data from a fault-free channel. If the fault persists, the
 
predetermined upper limit on the number of output monitor trips will be
 
exceeded and the fault will be declared permanent.
 
If no related fault is registered in the fault status table of a
 
channel, the routine to check for a persistent fault in other channels
 
is still performed. Thus, permanent failures of the total system are
 
determined independently by each channel.
 
11.3.2.2 Watchdog Monitor
 
The Watchdog Monitor is an independent (in term of hardware, from the
 
processor) fail-safe monitor of the real-time operation of each
 
computer. A computer fault condition will be indicated if the
 
synchronization indicator from the computer arrives outside a specified
 
time interval. If, in a following time frame, the synchronization
 
indicator falls back in the specified time interval, the fault
 
indication will be cleared. When the watchdog monitor trips, it sends a
 
command to the servo monitors to disengage the servos.
 
Timer interrupts occur when the time counts that define frames reach
 
zero. This initiates the synchronization process for a new frame. The
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local synchronization indicator is set and the local computer checks
 
other computers to determine if their synchronization indicators are
 
set. When all indicators are set, all channels clear their local
 
synchronization indicator and they are thus synchronized. Cross-channel
 
communication of the synchronization indicators is made through
 
dedicated hardware links.
 
11.3.2.3 Additional Testing of the Computer
 
In addition to these first-level monitors, the computers are provided
 
with hardware parity error detection for the Random Access Memory (RAM)
 
and arithmetic error detection for the processor. These interrupt the
 
processor when any error condition is detected. Furthermore, software
 
implemented self-test functions operate in the background mode, that is,
 
the self-test routines are executed whenever the processor is done with
 
all the computations allocated to the current time frame and there is
 
time remaining before the commencement of the next frame. The
 
self-tests include checking of all the instruction of the processor, the
 
integrity of the memory and the input/output ports.
 
Any fault detected is entered into the system fault status table, which
 
is used by the redundancy management software for reconfiguration and
 
maintenance routines to update failure records.­
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N1.3.3 Reconfiguration of servo failures
 
11.3.3.1 Servo Self-Monitor
 
The behavior of the servo self-monitor was briefly described in a
 
previous section. It compares the two output currents produced by the
 
dual servo electronics and performs the difference. If this exceeds a
 
predetermined threshold, a command is sent to the servo switch to
 
disengage the servo. The servo self-monitor also looks at the actuator
 
to determine whether it is engaged or shut off and signals the
 
processor. The servo self-monitor receives signals from the watchdog
 
monitor and the computer and disengages the servo accordingly.
 
11.3.3.2 Cross-Channel Servo Monitor
 
The cross-channel servo monitor is a software process that compares the
 
the sum of the coil currents for corresponding servos in the three
 
channels. Because the servo are close-loop control systems (they are
 
fed back the difference between the actual flap position and the desired
 
position), the cross-channel servo monitors can detect inconsistencies,
 
of the force applied by actuator. If a disagreement is noted and the
 
output monitor is not tripped, a servo fault is indicated and the
 
affected servo is disengaged.
 
11.3.4 Reconfiguration for Power Failures 
The power monitor's primary purpose is to indicate a power-on condition.
 
Once a power-on condition is indicated, the channel initiates a recovery
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process. This is the same recovery process as is generated after a
 
transient fault has disappeared.
 
Durii a initial startup (power-on interrupt) the local channel sets its
 
synchronization indicator. It then waits for 1.1 frame times and tests
 
if other channels are operating. If there are no other activities, the
 
local channel configures itself to operate in the simplex mode. If
 
another channel is operating, the local channel will synchronize with
 
it. As all state variable data required for recovery are transmitted
 
across the channels during every frame by the operating channels, the
 
new channel may now copy this data and start processing.
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II.4 Groung Test Mode of Operation
 
Extensive tests of the overall ARCS are performed- in the ground test
 
mode. The computer units are tested by a self-test of all intructions,
 
all registers and all addressing modes. The ROM and RAM are checked.
 
The hardware monitor are tested to insure that they are capable of
 
detecting and enunciating existence of fault conditions. The analog and
 
digital input/output ports are tested by wrap-around testing. Sensors
 
are tested utilizing built-in fault-detection mechanisms, self-tests and
 
operator simulated tests. Servo testing requires synchronization of the
 
redundant channels and includes tests for synchronization, engagement
 
control testing, dynamic response tests and force override tests.
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III. SYSTEM STATES AND THEIR CRITICALITY
 
III.1 Introduction
 
This section describes a method that makes it possible to enumerate all
 
the dangerous states in which the system can be. A very general
 
description of the method will be given and ARCS will be used as an
 
example. The first part introduces notations that are needed to be able
 
to represent the static state of the system at any point in time. The
 
second part looks at the various degrees of criticality the system can
 
be in. The last part gives a method to enumerate all the system states
 
with a given degree of criticality.
 
111.2 Notations
 
111.2.1 Partition of the channels into units
 
111.2.1.1 Switches
 
Each channel is composed of a collection of hardware and software
 
components. Among these components, there are some are switches. When
 
they are commanded, they disable some of the channel components (for
 
example the servo switches). Some other 'components' have similar
 
effects: they allow the channel to ignore data coming from some of its
 
components or from other channels. As a example in ARCS, one can
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mention the "do-not-use" flags that control whether or not sensor
 
outputs will be ignored, and also the fault-status table that indicates
 
whether or not a channel trusts the other channels. All these
 
components (whether hardware like the servo switches or software like
 
the "do-not-use" flags or the fault-status table) will be referred to as
 
switches. In ARCS, one can list as switches the trios of "do-not-use"
 
flags,the couples of "disregard-channel" flags in the local fault status
 
table, the servo switches and possibly, depending upon the exact
 
software specification of the system, a computer flag that will order
 
the computer to discontinue to send any further commands to the servo
 
electronics (Fig. 5).
 
111.2.1.2 Units
 
These switches induce a partition of the channels into units. A unit is
 
a set of components upon which all the switches have the same action.
 
For example, a sensor and its interface constitute a unit, for the loss
 
of either one implies the loss of both and the "do-not-use" flag will 
logically disconnect both out of the channel. The partition of a 
channel into units is not dictated by strict rules and the user has much 
liberty. One partition that can be given for the channels of ARCS is 
shown in Fig. 6 . However, one should note that, because each channel 
has access to other channel data by the cross-channel communication 
link, one should consider the computer and sensors of both channel A and 
channel C as units of channel B. A failure in computer A will cause 
computer B to disregard data coming from computer A or from its sensors. 
But a failure in one of the sensors of channel A will only disconnect 
that sensor. 
20
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The units in one channel will be numbered from I to n. Switches are
 
considered as units and are numbered from 1 to k. Because of the
 
symmetry between channels, all channels in ARCS have the same partition.
 
111.2.2 Failure Configuration Vectors
 
When a failure occurs in a unit, the unit behavior becomes potentially
 
incorrect. At any point in time, we can represent the state of an unit
 
(whether or not that unit has suffered a permanent failure) by a binary
 
variable. Let the three vectors AF, BF and CF represent the state of
 
the units in channels A, B and C respectively:
 
AiF = with t -0 if unit i of channel A is 
A <-AflAf 2 , "Afn > Afi 
fault-free, 
with Afi = 1 if unit i of channel A is 
faulty, 
' Bfn> BF <-Bfl Bf2 ) 

and
 
C{F <Cf, 1cf2'. Cfn
> -

The vectors AF, ,F and 0F will be called the failure configuration
 
vector for channel A, B and C respectively. If the state of a unit is
 
irrelevant, an x is put for its state variable. The complete system
 
failure configuration will be represented by r:
 
F <AF BF, cF>. 
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111.2.3 Channel Configuration Vectors
 
Following failure occurrences, each channel takes appropriate action by
 
commanding some switches to turn off. The units that are disabled-(or
 
disregarded) by the switch actions are said to be reconfigured out of
 
the channel. The configuration vectors, A R and itindicate whether
 
or not units are configured out of channel A, B and C respectively:
 
AR =<Ar1 Ar2 ' Ar> with Ar1 0 if unit i of channel A is 
not configured out of channel A, 
with Ari = 1 if unit i of channel A is 
configured out of channel A, 
I Brn>
 BR =<Brl, P2 .
 
and
 
>
 
.. , Cr'n .
CR <Cr , cr2 , 

Similarly to the failure configuration vectors, a entry of x means that
 
the state (configured in or out) is either one. The complete system
 
configuration will be represented by R:
 
= <A IR 
111.2.4 Channel and System States
 
Both the failure configuration vectors and the channel configuration
 
vectors give a static picture of the system at any point in time. The
 
failure configuration vectors indicate which units are faulty while the
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configuration vectors point to the units that are reconfigured out of
 
the channels at that time. One should note that it is conceptually
 
possible for one unit, for example a computer, to be reconfigured out of
 
one channel but still kept active in another channel. For example, when
 
a system operates in a triplex mode, a computer failure may not be
 
- detected-by the computer itself - or the computer will ignore the­
failure indications in provenance of the fault-detection mechanisms ­
while the other two channels will note the disagreement.
 
The static state of a channel can be defined as the couple formed of the
 
failure configuration and the channel configuration vectors for that
 
particular channel:
 
AR> = Static State of channel AA = <AF , 
= Static State of channel B
B= <BF, BR> 

= Static State of Channel C.
C Q = <CFI CR> 

The system state is the collection of all three channel states:
 
= <A , B9 CC = Static State of the system.
 
111.2.5 Channel Validity Equations
 
Because the correct functioning of every single unit in a channel is not
 
required for the channel to produce the correct pressures on the voters,
 
there is a boolean expression, V, that relates the correctness of the
 
channel commands to output mechanisms (actuators, displays,...) to the
 
state of the channel units. This expression, V, involves as variables
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both the failure state of the units , excluding the output units, and
 
the configuration state (whether or not the unit is still configured in
 
the channel). For unit i of any channel (channel A for example),
 
AfIis 1 when the unit is faulty and Ari is 1 when the unit is
 
configured out of the channel. So, in the actual system configuration,
 
unit i correctly performs its function if and only if both Afi and Ari
 
are 0. So, the validity expression, V, can be expressed as a function
 
of the AND of vectors AF and AR:
 
,V(A.R) = 1 implies that channel A in state <A AR> produces 
correct commands to all the output devices, 
' 
= 0 implies that channel A in state <AF, AR> does not
 
produce correct commands to the output devices.
 
The validity expression does not indicate whether the actual outputs are
 
correct. A faulty output mechanism, like an actuator, can yield
 
incorrect pressures even if the channel is correct. The validity
 
expression is important because the computers control several output
 
devices and a failure in one output device does not influence the
 
correctness of other output devices.
 
The expression V can be easily obtained from the system description. It
 
directly expresses the redundancy that a channel can take advantage of
 
to carry its computations.
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111.3 State Criticality and Associated Conditions
 
Failures can be globally considered as transitions between static system
 
states. So, the criticality of failures is directly related to the
 
notion of system state criticality.
 
111.3.1 Voter Behavior and its Influence on State Criticality
 
Corresponding actuators in the three channels produce pressures which
 
are force-voted by mechanical voters which position the aircraft flaps.
 
When one of the three pressures is incorrect, the mechanical voter is
 
presented with contradictory forces. The resulting flap position
 
depends upon the behavior of the voter in such a situation. For the
 
completeness of any analysis related to system crash, one must examine
 
carefully how the mechanical voter behaves in such conditions.
 
111.3.1.1 Correct Flap Positioning with one Faulty Actuator
 
The mechanical voters are devices which translate a set of three input
 
pressures, P1, P2, P3' into a flap position. The actual motion of the
 
flap between its initial position and the desired position indicated by
 
the pressures is subject to a differential equation. The final flap
 
position (if there is a steady state solution) depends upon the three
 
pressures P1, P2, P3. A detailed study of the mechanical voter behavior
 
is required to check if the actual final position of the flap is within
 
tolerance when one of the three pressures, let assume p,, differs from
 
the others. Such a analysis of the voter will likely give a range of
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values for ply as a function of P2 and P3' where the final flap position
 
is within tolerance. Only if this range covers the complete range of
 
values for ply and this for all possible values of P2 and P3' will the
 
voter always adequately'compensate for a faulty pressure (compensation
 
in the sense that the flap position is within tolerance). However, the
 
flap motion is subject to a differential equation, so it is still
 
possible that the flap will reach its final position with large
 
oscillations that may damage the aircraft. So, in addition to an
 
analysis of the static behavior of the voter, one also must analyse the
 
dynamic behavior of the flap motion as a function of the three input
 
pressures , plyP2, P3. 
The complete analysis of the flap motion (including the static behavior
 
of the voter when one input pressure disagrees with the other two and
 
the corresponding motion of the flap) will yield operating ranges where
 
the system operates correctly with two fault-free pressures and a faulty
 
one. These ranges will be called the adequate compensation ranges.
 
Only if the adequate compensation ranges cover all the possible
 
operating ranges with one faulty pressure, will the operating mode - two
 
fault-free pressures, one faulty one - corresponds to a fault-free mode
 
of operation for the system. If it is possible that a faulty actuator
 
which is not disengaged causes potential dangers to the aircraft, for
 
example flap positionings that are slightjy off or aircraft vibrations
 
and oscillations, the operating mode with one faulty pressure at a voter
 
input will be called a dangerous mode of operation.
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III.3.1.2 Modes of Operation Dictated by the Output Mechanisms
 
The description of the mechanical behavior of the actuators and voters
 
is not very detailed in the ARCS report. However, it is conceivable
 
that several other modes of operation with various degrees of
 
criticality can be defined for the set voter-flap. In general, one can
 
say that the output devices will dictate a partition of the operating
 
modes into several classes with different degrees of criticality. For
 
ARCS, a simple analysis gives the following modes of operation:
 
- All three pressures at the voter inputs agree: the voter is not
 
submitted to undue stresses,
 
- Two input pressures agree, the third one is in disagreement: the
 
voter may or may not compensate adequately depending upon the value
 
of the incorrect pressure,
 
- Two input pressures agree, the third actuator is shut-off; the flap
 
position will be correctly controlled by the two agreeing pressures,
 
- Only one pressure is fed to the voter: the flap position is
 
controlled b3 that pressure,
 
- Two pressures are applied to the voter but they disagree: the flap
 
position will depend upon the relation between the disagreeing
 
pressures,
 
- No pressure is applied: the flap does not move.
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111.3.2 Modes of Operations and Their Degree of Criticality
 
The modes of operation dictated by the behavior of the output mechanisms
 
need to be extended to take into account, the correctness of the
 
pressures each channel produces. For example, if the voter receives
 
three pressures that agree, it does not necessarily mean that they are
 
the correct pressures. For a system such as ARCS, one can enumerate the
 
various modes of operation:
 
- Each mechanical voter (one per flap) receives three identical
 
pressures that are the correct ones: all the flaps will be correctly
 
moved, the system is fault-free.
 
- Each mechanical voter 'receives at least two correct, identical
 
pressures but none receives a third pressure that disagrees with the
 
other two. At least two actuators for each voter produce the correct
 
pressure and the third one either also produces the correct pressure
 
or is disengaged, thus the system is fault-free (all the flaps moved
 
correctly) and there is no potential danger (no flap oscillations nor
 
slightly-off positioning),
 
- One of the mechanical voters receives only one pressure, the correct
 
one, while all the other voters receive either two or three correct
 
pressures but no incorrect pressures. The system is still
 
fault-free; all the flaps are correctly positioned but the tolerance
 
to further failures is low.
 
- At least one voter receives two correct and one incorrect pressure
 
and all the other voters receive only correct pressures, either one
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two or three. If the discrepency between the pressures is not too
 
large, (if the voter adequately compensates for it), then the system
 
is still operating correctly. However, this mode of operation is
 
quite dangerous since an increase in the discrepency may produce
 
oscillations or slighly incorrect positioning. Such a mode of
 
operation will be called dangerous aod warrants special study.
 
- The system has failed (not able any longer to position correctly the
 
flaps) but was able to signal the fact to the pilot before issuing
 
any wrong commands to the servos. This is a safe failure; the system
 
has suffered a fail-safe crash.
 
- The system has failed but was not able to signal the fact to the
 
pilot. Thus, the system is still in control of the aircraft but
 
sends wrong positioning commands to the flaps. This is the worst
 
mode of operation.
 
These modes of operation are listed in increasing order of criticality.
 
In general, for any system, one can list all the operating modes and
 
order them by increasing criticality. We will assume, in the following,
 
that the system has d modes of operation, ordered from 1 to d by
 
increasing critcality. One should note that the notion of modes of
 
operation carries far more meaning that the simpler notion of
 
fault-free/failed dichotomy. A failure pattern (successive occurrences
 
of different failures) may take the system from a fault-free state to a
 
failed state, but each individual failure in the pattern will correspond
 
to a transition between different operating modes, in general from a
 
mode with a given criticality to another mode with a higher criticality.
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111.3.3 Conditions Associated with Operating Modes
 
For the system to be in a given mode of operation, it must satisfy some
 
conditions. These conditions express the requirements on the system
 
state in terms of failure and channel configurations. For example, for
 
the dangerous mode of operation one has the following conditions:
 
For at least one actuator trio, trio U, two channels produce the
 
correct pressure while the third one gives an incorrect pressure
 
(actuator still engaged): This can be expressed in terms of the
 
state variables as follows:
 
([V(A - Aful + Ar4= 0 Servo u of channel A produces 
(VC) B ru )r 
. 
incorrect pressures.
orVAF.ARf) . Ar I BAfu -- Sreufhnl prou1e(VF. R) . Cfu * 1 )ru 
AAR -A -Au/ 1 Servo u of channel B produces
 
VB) Bru) : incorrect pressures.
BuJ 

orVuVR) f. cru)= 1A'4v(Y.Ah Aru 1 Serv~o u of channel C produces 
(VB FB .A Bu aru) incorrect pressures. 
([V(Ci.JS) -cpu] + c__U ) 
For all other actuator trios, there are either one, two or three
 
correct pressures and no faulty actuator still engaged:
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V(A9.AR) . Af r = 1
 
AF A A v A v
 
vc. Dry rY =1iDf 

V(CF'cR) - cf" Brv 	=1 
or v 0 
V( B.BR) B v fi 1 
V(C.-R) - Cfv •.cry	 : I 
vVD~j Byv Byv:
 
.c R)
V(cF . C fv . C ry 1
 
.or V(A F.AR) . Af v	 Arv =I
 
cRry =
 
or 	V(AF.A ) . Af r
 
Brv =0
 
crv 
 0
 
or A.A0
 
V(BF.BR) B B
fv Dry
 
c ry 	 = 0 
or 	Arv = 0
 
Brv 	= 0 
V(CF.cR) . f . rv 
For every operating mode, one can list all the associated conditions in
 
terms of the variables of vectors F and R. The set of conditions for
 
the operating mode with criticality degree d will be referred to as
 
{C d} F
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It is possible to simplify these conditions by boolean manipulations.
 
It is also possible to express these conditions in a table form that may
 
provide a simpler way to represent the state of the system. r
 
111.3.4 System States that Correspond to a Given Operating Mode.
 
As it was shown, it is possible to find a set of conditions that must be
 
satisfied for the system to be in a given operating mode. These
 
conditions are also sufficient.
 
These boolean conditions provide a mathematical means to find all the
 
states the system can be in for a given operating mode. The system
 
states are given by the combination of the F and R vectors that satisfy
 
the conditions {Cd).
 
All the system states that satisfy the conditions for a given operating
 
mode have the criticality of this operating mode. However, it is
 
possible that some of these states can not actually occur in the
 
systems. A fault pattern that leads the system from an,initial
 
fault-free state to a final state characterized by the failure
 
configuration vectors F will allow only certain actions to be taken.
 
For example,-it is not possible that the failure of one actuator in
 
channel A causes the computer of channel B to be'declared faulty (as
 
long as everything else is fault-fTee). So, once all the possible
 
system states that correspond to a given operating mode are enumerated,
 
it is necessary to study whether or not they can actually occur in the
 
system. This will involve looking at the detection, diagnosisand
 
reconfiguration processes and is the subject of section IV.
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III.4 A Method to Enumerate All the System States with Given Criticality
 
The process for finding all the system states that can correspond to a
 
given mode 6f operation, hence to a given criticality degree, can be
 
automated and implemented as a computer program. It follows closely the
 
step& described in the previous sections (Fig. 7). The advantages of
 
such an computer implementation are first and foremost that it will
 
yield a complete enumeration of all the potentially dangerous states,
 
and secondly, that it allows fast system analysis, hence, the
 
possibility to study the effects of various system modifications.
 
111.4.1 First Step
 
The first step of the method is to look at the system under study and to
 
find a partition into channels. One also needs to find all the output
 
voters. Careful study of these voters (especially when they are
 
mechanical devices as in ARCS) will tell if, when and with which
 
confidence voters can compensate for faulty inputs. This will give a
 
first partition of the system operating modes ( for example, all inputs
 
in agreement; the majority of the inputs in agreement, all other inputs
 
disengaged; the majority of inputs in agreement, one input disagrees,
 
and all remaining inputs are disengaged, ...
 
III.4.2 Second Step
 
The second step consists in looking at each channel and in finding all
 
the ways a channel can disable/disengage/disregard a piece of logic.
 
This requires a study of the system hardware and of the
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hardware/software process of reconfiguration (to find the software
 
implemented switches). This will give the set of switches and also a
 
partition of the channel into units (partition with respect to the
 
control of the switces and their action on the system). This step
 
should also provide the controllability and the controlling matrices
 
(which units control the switches and which units are disabled by the
 
switches). This information will be useful while looking at the
 
detection/diagnosis/reconfiguration processes to decide which of the
 
critical states can actually occur.
 
Because of the use of redundancy (both internal redundancy inside the
 
channels and external redundancy such as the use of sensor data from,
 
other channels) one needs to find the conditions that a channel must
 
satisfy in order that the commands it sends to its output devices be
 
correct. These conditions can be expressed as a boolean expression,
 
expression V, that involves the states and configuration (fault-free,
 
faulty, enabled, disabled) of the system units.
 
111.4.3 Third Step
 
The third step consists in listing all the operating modes as functions
 
of the partition induced by the behavior of the output voters and the
 
validity of the channel outputs. For each mode of operation, it is
 
necessary to find the corresponding boolean conditions in terms of the
 
failure vectors, F, the configuration vectors, R, and the channel
 
validity expression.
 
37 
III.4.4 Fourth Step
 
This last step consists in finding all the solutions (all the system
 
states) that satisfy all the conditions for the various operating modes.
 
A complete enumeration of all the solutions may require much computation ­
since it will require looking at every state and checking whether or not
 
it meets the conditions. Some simplification can be obtained if all the
 
channels are similar (taking advantage of the symmetries in the
 
solutions). Also, as xe are principally concerned with the analysis of
 
the system tolerance to the first few failures (i.e. the first, second
 
and third failures), one can significantly reduce the amount of
 
computation if we limit ourselves to them. This step will yield all the
 
system states with a given criticality (the criticality of the operating
 
mode) and with the additional restriction that only a few units have
 
suffered failures (first few failures).
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IV. FAULT-PATTERNS AND THEIR CRITICALITY
 
IV. Introduction
 
The previous section presented a method to list all the system states
 
with a given criticality. In this section, we will make the
 
correspondance-between the critical system states and the fault-patterns
 
(successive occurrences of failures) that take the system from the
 
initial fault-free state to these critical states. This will provide a
 
method to list all the failure events that can leave the system in a
 
critical, dangerous or failed state without analyzing every single
 
failure.
 
The method to go from the static states to the fault-patterns is
 
illustrated in Fig. 8. First, for each critical state, one has to find
 
all the combinations of failures that can drive the system in such a
 
state (obtained from the failure configuration vectors). The order of
 
occurrences is important since a failure can affect the functioning of a
 
fault-detection mechanism for a later failure. So, this first step will
 
give all the possibly critical fault-patterns that correspond to a given
 
critical state. Secondly, we will look at the detection process and
 
find all the possible error indications that can produced following a
 
failure. Then, one needs to consider the diagnosis process and find
 
which diagnosis will be produced for a given set of error indications.
 
The next step is to find which commands are sent to the switches and
 
what is the final system state. Thus, we will be able to decide
 
whether, and under which conditions, a failure can leave the system in a
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given state. This process will then be repeated for each of the
 
individual failures that make up the possibly critical fault-patterns.
 
Then, we can decide whether a possibly critical fault-pattern can indeed
 
drive the system into a critical state.
 
This method will provide the list of all the fault-patterns that leave
 
the system in a critical state. Each individual failure in the pattern
 
will be characterized by its location (at the unit level), the list of
 
error indications that is produced, the diagnosis that is generated and
 
the actual commands sent to the system switches.
 
The enumeration of all the critical fault-patterns is very helpful for
 
evaluating the system tolerance to failures. It will indicate which
 
unit(s) is (are) the most critical and, hence, where additional testing
 
will be beneficial. It is also a necessary step before studying the
 
detailed hardware-description of each unit and enumerating all the
 
critical hardware failures. A complete enumeration of all the single
 
and double (without mentioning triple) failures is a' prohibitive task.
 
But the knowledge of the critical fahlt-patterns and their
 
characteristics will sustantially reduce the number of actual failures
 
that need to be analyzed.
 
IV.2 Definitions and Notations
 
IV.2.1 Fault-Patterns
 
A fault-pattern is a succession of failure occurrence. The order in
 
which failures occur can be quite important. For example, if we assume
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that ARCS is operating in a simplex mode (only one channel up), an
 
undetected failure in a sensor followed by a detected failure in the
 
processor will cause an unsafe system crash. The undetected failure in
 
the sensor will cause wrong commandsto be-issued to.the actuators. On
 
the other hand, if the computer failure (which is detected) occurs
 
first, the computer will be able to signal the pilot, hence, this will
 
be a safe failure. One can represents a fault-pattern that takes the
 
system from the initial fault-free state to a final state with failure
 
vectors AF, B F and C as the series of state transitions:
 
F F dFx20 = <FOP R>- > R ....= <F, RI > >f =<F, Rx> 
Each of the individual failure occurrence will be denoted by dF where i
 
refers to the rank of the failure in the pattern.
 
IV.2.2 Detection Mechanisms and Detection Vectors
 
Each channel of ARCS is provided with fault-detection mechanisms that
 
are either hardware or software. We will call a fault-detection
 
mechanism, also referred to as a detector, every hardware or software
 
component of the channel that can detect the presence of failure. ARCS
 
has the following detectors (Fig. 9):
 
a sensor self-monitor for every sensor,
 
a cross channel sensor monitor (also called SSFD) for every sensor,
 
a computer self-test in every channel,
 
a watchdog monitor for every computer,
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a cross-channel synchronization monitor in every channel, 
a cross-channel output monitor in every channel, 
a servo self-monitor for every servo, 
and a cross-channel servo monitor for every servo.
 
In general, it is quite simple to list all the fault-detection
 
mechanisms for any computer systems. In the following, one will assume
 
that each channel has k fault-detection mechanisms.
 
Following the occurrence of a failure, some of the fault-detection
 
mechanisms may indicate the presence of the failure. Let At. denote the 
binary variable which indicates whether or not detector j in channel A 
has detected the failure: 
AT ... , Ark > with Ati = 0 if detector j of channel A = <At1 , At 

does not give an error indication
 
with Atj= 1 if detector j of channel A 
gives an error indication,
 
,

BT = <Btl , Bt2 ... I Btk
>
 
.
and CT = <Ct ct22 ... Ctk >
J 

The vectors AT, B T and CT are called the detection vectors (also referred
 
to as trip vectors). The overall detection vector is denoted by T:
 
T <AT, BT CT> 
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IV.2.3 Diagnosis Mechanisms and Diagnosis Vectors
 
When a fault-detection mechanism gives an error indication, it is
 
sometimes required for each channel to perform some diagnosis. -For
 
example, when the cross-channel output monitor in channel B detects a
 
disagreement, the complxter of channel B heeds to test itself, to send
 
information to other channels, to check the validity of other channels
 
(based on the information it receives) and to make a decision based on
 
its fault-status table and past failure history. This process is called
 
the diagnosis process realized by the computer. However, the diagnosis
 
process is not run for every error indication. For example, when the
 
watchdog monitor or the servo self-monitor indicates an error, this
 
information is sent directlyt to the servo self-monitor to command the
 
actuator switch to turn off. The computer does not run the diagnosis
 
program.
 
In general, one will call diagnosis mechanism any component that looks
 
at some of the detectors and makes a decision concerning where the
 
failure is located. In most systems, diagnosis will be performed by the
 
computers (when there is need for diagnosis). However, to be quite
 
general, one will assume that each channel can have more than one
 
diagnosis mechanism (let m represent such diagnosis mechanism). Each
 
diagnosis mechanism looks at some of the indications coming from the
 
detectors and decides where the failure is located inside a 'subset of
 
the channel. So, for each diagnosis mechanism, there is a corresponding
 
diagnosis vector that indicates the decision made by that particular
 
diagnosis mechanism concerning the location of the failure:
 
45 
ADu <Adi, Ad2, Ad,> with Adi = 0 if the diagnosis mechanism
 
of channel A does not locate the
 
failure in unit i of channel A,
 
with Adi = 1 if the diagnosis mechanism
 
locates the failure in unit i of
 
channel A,
 
with Adi = 2 if unit i of channel A is
 
not part of the diagnosis range of
 
the detection mechanism.
 
,

BDu= <Bdl, Bd2 ... Bdn
> ,
 
I Cdn>
 CDu <cdl1 cd2 1 ... . 
These diagnosis vectors carry the information that the system has about
 
itself. For notation simplicity, one will use AD (BDor CD) to refer
 
to the set of all diagnosis vectors produced in channel A (B or C):
 
Am> AD <AD1' AD2f 

B <BDi, 2 

c " <cD1, c2Y ... 
' 
IcDm>. 
Also, we will use D to refer to the complete system diagnosis: 
D= <ADI , ... I ­
IV.2.4 Switch Control Mechanisms and Switch Vectors
 
When an error indication is produced by a fault-detection mechanism, it
 
is necessary to command some switches in order to reconfigure the faulty
 
unit out of the channel. These commands may be sent directly by the
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fault-detection mechanisms or by the computer following the diagnosis
 
process. For example, as soon as the watchdog monitor indicates an
 
error, a signal is sent to all the servo self-monitor to order them to
 
turn off the actuator switches. The units that actually control the
 
switches can be different from the units that perform the detection or
 
the fiiagnosis. For example, the control of the actuator switches is
 
done by the servo self-monitor (and not directly by the watchdog
 
monitor). So, a careful analysis of the system needs to take into
 
account the fact that while signals may be sent to the servo
 
self-monitors to order them to turn off the actuator switches, some of
 
these monitors may be faulty and not command their switch to disengage
 
the actuator. When switches are implemented in software, for example,
 
the "do-not-use" flags for the inputs sensors, they are directly
 
controlled by the mechanisms that perform the diagnosis, for example the
 
computer. In general, one will assume that some switches have control
 
mechanisms different from the diagnosis mechanisms. These control
 
mechanisms will be called the switch control mechanisms.
 
So, the switches are controlled either directly by the diagnosis
 
mechanisms or indirectly through the switch control mechanisms. In both
 
cases, one car represent the actual commands issued to the switches by
 
the binary variable s. where s. is one if the switch j is commanded to
3 3
 
turn off;
 
S
= <A s , ... , S > with AS = 0 if switch j of channel A isA A A522 A k A j1' ' 
not commanded to turn off,
 
with Asi = 1 if switch j of channel A is
 
commanded to-turn off,
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B8s2' Bsk>
<c~,c  s>
B3S = Bs1' .
 
Cs 'Csk >
911 C 2Y
C 

Similarly to the previous sections, S will refer to the set of the three
 
channel switch vectors:
 
S = <A S S, c3>. 
These switch vectors carry all the information concerning the control of
 
the switches after diagnosis. From them, if one knows the state
 
(fault-free or faulty) of every switch, one can deduce the actual system
 
configuration.
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IV.3 Detection Process
 
IV.3.1 Detection Range
 
Each fault-detection mechanism can not detect failures in all the units.
 
For example the sensor self-monitors can detect failures only in the
 
corresponding sensor. 
 For each detection mechanism, one can list all
 
the units for which it can detect the presence of failures. This will
 
be called the range of the detector. In general, one can use a matrik
 
notation to express the range of detection:
 
N
 
Units --- > Detectors
 
with
 
N = [nij] with nij = 0 if detector j can not detect the presence of
 
failures in unit i,
 
nl .= 1 if detectorj is able to detect the presence
 
of failures in unit i.
 
In ARCS all the channels are identical, so it will be the same matrix
 
for every channel. In systems with dissimilar channels, it will be
 
required to use one detection matrix for every channel. It should be
 
noted that the detection matrices indicate only if failures can be
 
detected. Even if a detector can detect only some of all the failures
 
that can occur in a unit, this unit will still be considered as part of
 
the range of the detector.
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IV.3.2 Complete Versus Incomplete Detection
 
While most of the fault-detection mechanisms can not detect every single
 
failure in the units they cover, the detectors that use cross-channel
 
comparison are able to achieve complete detection (at least for the
 
first two failures). Thus, one needs to classify the fault-detection
 
mechanisms as providing either complete or incomplete detection. The
 
difference is important since most of the critical system states are
 
reached following failures that are not detected. Furthermore, as it
 
will be our goal to list all the possible fault-patterns along with
 
their detection, diagnosis, switch and reconfiguration vectors, one
 
needs to find all the possible detection vectors that can occur
 
following a failure. If a detector does not achieve 100% detection,
 
then we need to consider that it may or may not detect the failure.
 
Even for the detection mechanisms that use cross-channel comparison,
 
100% detection is not always guaranteed. For example, when two channels
 
are down, the output cross-channel comparison in the third channel
 
becomes a meaningless process (which is not in fact carried out). Thus,
 
complete detection is still dependent upon the system state. In
 
general, it is easy to list the conditions that must be satisfied for a
 
fault-detection by cross-channel comparison to achieve 100% detection.
 
This can be mathematically expressed as:
 
channel state A = A > t0, 1}<AFA> g 
with
 
R - g >
<AF,AB>-----> 0 if, in state <AFAR>, detector j does not achieve
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complete detection,
 
<AFAR> ------ if, in state <A R detector j achieyes perfect> 1 

detection.
 
IV.3.3 Implementation of the Fault-Detection Mechanisms
 
The fault-detection mechanisms need to use some of the units to perform
 
their detection function. If these units are defective, then the
 
behavior of the fault-detection mechanisms may possibly be affected.
 
For example, the cross-channel output monitor that should always detect
 
the first diasagreement between the channel outputs may not detect it if
 
the computer that performs the comparison is itself faulty It is also
 
possible that a detector will give an erroneous error indication when
 
the units used to perform the detection are faulty. For example, a
 
computer failure may cause the cross-chAnnel sensor monitor to decide
 
that the sensor is faulty when, in fact, it is the computer that is
 
faulty.
 
For each fault-detection mechanism, one can list the set of units that
 
they use. This can be expressed in a matrix form:
 
M
Units ------- > Detectors 
M =Em j] = Detector implementation matrix 
with m.. = 0 if unit i is not used to implement the function 
of detector j, 
with m = 1 if unit i is used to implement the function of 
detector j. 
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In ARCS, because all three channels are identical, there will be only
 
one such detector implementation matrix. For systems with dissimilar
 
channels, one matrix per channel will be required.
 
Given the channel failure configuration, the detector implementation
 
matrix makes it possible to list all the detectors which may either
 
produce incorrect error indication or fail to generate an error
 
indication.
 
IV.3.4 Set of All Possible Detection Vectors
 
Given the system initial failure configuration (the F,R vector) and an
 
occurrence of an individual failure (individual failure dF), one can
 
find the set of all possible detection vectors. The first step is to
 
find all the detectors that can detect the failure (using the detection
 
matrix). The second step consists in finding whether some detectors
 
achieve complete detection (using the g function). The third step is to
 
find the set of faulty units that are used to implement the relevant
 
detection functions (using the detector implementation matrix). These
 
three steps yield the set of all detection vectors that can follow that
 
particular failure occurrence:
 
-* dF ­
-------S > AT set of detection vectors for channel A that
 
correspond to failure dF (in state Q),
 
dF
 
B that
set of detection vectors for channel
BF........ > BTI 

correspond to failure dF (in state Q), 
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CF
- -> C = 	 set of detection vectors for channel C that 
correspond to failure dF (in state 9). 
For simplicity, we 	will use T to refer to the complete detection:
 
T= <AT BT , cT>. 
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IV.4 Diagnosis Process
 
IV.4.1 Diagnosis Mechanisms
 
Sometimes, when a fault-detection mechanism gives an error indication,
 
each channel needs to perform some diagnosis to locate the unit where
 
the failure has occurred. For example, any error indication provided by
 
a cross-channel monitor requires finding which channel is faulty. This
 
can be quite simple, for example in the case of cross-channel servo
 
monitor Diagnosis consists simply in finding which of three servos
 
disagrees with the other two. On the other hand, when a cross-channel
 
output monitor detects an error, the diagnosis is more complex since it
 
is required that two of the three channels reach a consensus. Some
 
other error indications do not require follow-up diagnosis. For
 
example, an error indication in provenance of the watchdog monitor or
 
the sensor self-monitor does not trigger any diagnosis since these
 
fault-detection mechanisms monitor only one unit each.
 
In ARCS, all the diagnoses are performed by the channel computers.
 
However, in general, one can assume that each channel has more than one
 
diagnosis mechanism (up to m). Each diagnosis mechanism looks at only
 
some of the indications provided by the channel fault-detection
 
mechanisms. For example, error indications given by the servo
 
self-monitors are ignored. The set of the error indications that a
 
diagnosis mechanism looks at will be called the input range. Each
 
diagnosis mechanism can locate the failure only inside a subset of the
 
channel units (for example determine whether the failure occurs in the
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computer of either channel A, B or C). So, the diagnosis performed by a
 
diagnosis mechanism is not a complete system diagnosis. One can call a
 
diagnosis output range the set of units which can be distinguished by a
 
diagnosis mechanism (cf. section IV.2.3).
 
For every diagnosis mechanism, one can define:
 
input range = subset of the channel error indications,
 
output range = subset of the channel units,
 
input = error indications from the input range,
 
output = diagnosis vector,
 
diagnosis algorithm = function relating the output to the input.
 
For every system, it should be possible to obtain the input and output
 
ranges of every diagnosis mechaniism. This is available from the
 
description of the diagnosis algorithms with which the system are
 
provided.
 
IV.4.2 Diagnosis Algorithm
 
The process of going from an error indication to a diagnosis vector is
 
called the diagnosis algorithm. Each diagnosis mechanism has one such
 
algorithm (that can be either software or implemented in hardware). The
 
exact mathematical description of the diagnosis algorithms may be quite
 
complex. However, it is available, from the system description (the
 
software specifications relative to diagnosis). In the following, one
 
will assume that the diagnosis algorithms perform mappings from the
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detector indication vectors to the diagnosis vectors that are dependent
 
only upon the system state before the failure occurrence:
 
detection algorithm D 
F -AT> ---for diagnosis mechanism j- A Dj 
Tdetection algorithm
BT > 
---for diagnosis mechanism j-
 BDj 
fodetection algorithm
 
CT > <F1 --- for diagnosis mechanism j-> CD 
with 
, 	 adi ='0 if diagnosis mechanism jA j = 	<Adl, Ad2 ... , Adn> with 
diagnoses unit i of channel A as
 
fault-free,
 
with 	adi = I if diagnosis mechanism j
 
diagnoses unit i of channel A as
 
faulty,
 
with 	ad. = 2 if diagnosis mechanism j
 
is not intended to diagnose unit
 
i of channel A.
 
IV.4.3 	Implementation of the Diagnosis Algorithms
 
The diagnosis mechanisms can be faulty and, hence, the diagnosis vectors
 
they produce may be different from those produced by fault-free
 
mechanisms. For example a computer failure may cause the processor to
 
decide that another channel is faulty when it is not so. Thus, one also
 
needs to 'take into account the state (fault-free or faulty) of each
 
diagnosis mechanisms to find all the possible diagnosis vectors that can
 
be produced when an error indication is produced. This requires finding
 
all the channel units used to run the diagnosis algorithms. For example
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in ARCS, diagnosis is performed by the computers. In general, one can
 
list all the units used by a given diagnosis mechanism to perform its
 
function. Similarly to what was done , for the fault-detection
 
mechanisms, one can use a matrix notation:
 
Units > Diagnosis Mechanisms
 
M1 = Em"ij = Diagnosis Implementation Matrix 
with m'.. = 0 if unit i is.not used to implement the
 
function of the diagnosis mechanism j,
 
with m'.. = 1 if unit i is used in the implementation 
of the function of diagnosis mechanism j.
 
In ARCS, since all the channels are identical, there will be only one
 
such diagnosis implementation matrix (which is extremely simple). For
 
systems with dissimilar channels, one matrix per channel will be
 
required.
 
IV.4.4 Set of All Possible Diagnosis Vectors
 
For each of the detection vectors that can be produced following a
 
failure, (occurrence of failure dF while the system has a failure
 
configuration given by F), it is necessary to find all the possible
 
diagnosis vectors that can result. This can be done in three steps:
 
find all the diagnosis mechanisms that look at the error indications 
of the detection vector, 
for each one, find the diagnosis vector that would be produced should
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the diagnosis mechanism be fault-free. This can be done using the
 
description of the diagnosis algorithm.
 
find the diagnosis mechanisms that are affected by the failure
 
configuration of the system (either by the failure that causes-the
 
diagnosis to be run or by all the previous failures). This is
 
achieved by looking at the the system failure configuration and the
 
diagnosis implementation matrix, M'. The diagnosis produced by these
 
diagnosis mechanisms can be incorrect. Thus, one needs to consider
 
that every single diagnosis vector can occur.
 
So, for each detector indication vector, one can find the set of all the
 
possible diagnosis vectors that can result:
 
<F, AT> ------- > A1 } ' { A D2}' ADm)
 
F, >------- 3D1}, BY, . Bm
< >------- > D ..., c .
 
For simplicity in the notations, one can say that a particular detector
 
indication vector, T , in a given system failure configuration, F I
 
yields a set of possible diagnosis vectors, [D}:­
<F, T> ------- > {D. 
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IV.5 Switch Process
 
IV.5.1 Switch Control Mechanisms
 
As it was previously mentioned,, some of the switches are controlled by 
the diagnosis mechanisms while others are under the control of the 
switch control mechanisms. The switch control mechanisms receive 
signals either from the fault-detection mechanisms or from the diagnosis 
mechanisms. In ARCS, all the signals received by the servo 
self-monitors have the same meaning: a request to turn off the actuator 
switch. If the servo monitor is fault-free, reception of any single 
signal will result in a command being sent to the actuator switch to 
disengage. However, one can conceive systems in which the switch 
control mechanisms are also provided with some intelligence to resolve 
possible inconsistencies between the incoming signals. In general, one 
can say that each switch control mechanism receives inputs from some 
fault-detection mechanisms (some components of the detector indication 
vectors) and from the diagnosis mechanisms (some components of the 
diagnosis vectors) and controls the switch according to some function of 
the input signal (for example reception of any signal results in a 
command to the switch to turn off): 
For every switch control mechanism, one has:
 
inputs = subset of the detector indication vectors
 
+ subset of'the diagnosis vectors,
 
outputs = {stay on, turn off) commands to the switches
 
function = relation between the inputs and outputs.
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For every system, it is possible to list all the switch control
 
mechanisms and to find their inputs and the function they implement.
 
This is available from the hardware and software description of the
 
channels. So, for every detector indication and diagnosis vectors,,it
 
is possible to find what should, be the commands received by all the
 
switches should the switch control mechanisms be fault-free:
 
< T, D >------- S => <A Cs> 
IV.5.2 Implementation of the Switch Control Mechanisms
 
For a complete study, one needs to find which channel units are used to
 
implement the function of the switch control mechanisms. Similarly to
 
what was done for the fault-detection mechanisms and the diagnosis
 
mechanisms, one can use a matrix notation to represent which units are
 
used by the switch control mechanisms:
 
Units ------> Switch switch control mechanisms
 
M" = Em")ij = Switch Control Implementation Matrix 
with m".. = 0 if unit i is not used in the implementation
ij
 
of the switch control mechanism j,
 
with m" = 1 if unit i ia used in the implementation of
 
13 
the switch control mechanism j. 
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IV.5.3 Set of All Possible Switch Vectors
 
For each combination of detection and diagnosis vectors, it is necessary
 
to find all the possible combinations of commands that are received by
 
the switch (this in order to find all the possible system
 
configurations). This can be performed in two steps:
 
find all the switches that are controlled directly by the diagnosis
 
(or detection) mechanisms. For each one, find the switch command
 
that corresponds to the particular diagnosis (detection) vector.
 
find all the switches that are controlled through a switch control
 
mechanism. Find the switch control mechanisms that are affected by
 
the failures the system has suffered. This can be obtained from the
 
system configuration vector, R , by using the matrix M".
 
So, for every combination of a detection vector, T , and a diagnosis 
vector, D, one can find the set of all the possible commands that are 
issued to the switches:
 
F, AT, AD >--------> ( }
 
,------->
<F, BT, 
< F, T, ' > -- - - > {C-9 -
For simplicity in the notations, one will write:
 
<F, T >------>> 
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IV.6 Reconfiguration Process
 
IV.6.1 Final System State
 
The commands issued to the switches along with the state of the switches
 
dictate completely the system configuration (the R vector). Switches
 
can fail in such a way that either they ignore the commands or they turn
 
off without being issued any command. The first kind of failure van be
 
called unsafe failure since it is far more dangerous for a faulty unit
 
to be enabled than for a fault-free unit to be accidentally disabled.
 
Given the switch vectors and the knowledge of the switch states, one can
 
find the system configuration:
 
<AF , AS> ------- > A ,
 
,
<B BS>-------> B 
<cF, c> ------ > c.
 
which can also be noted as:
 
<t 'g>-------S  >?.I R  
IV.6.2 Consistent Static System States
 
Section III presented a method to list all the possible static system
 
states with a given criticality. However, as it was mentioned, some of
 
these states could never occur in the actual system. This present
 
section gives a method to find which static states can actually occur.
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Furthermore, and even more importantly, it also characterizes the
 
fault-patterns that can drive the system in these dangerous states.
 
Fault-patterns were defined as ordering of individual failure
 
occurrences:
 
± dF dF - dF dFx - -
F ---- 2 ------> Fx = F.F1 -... 

For each individual failure in the fault-pattern, it was hown bow to
 
find all the detection vectors that could possibly be produced:
 
<F, d ------- > PT}. 
Then, for each detection vector, one can find all the possible diagnosis
 
vectors that are produced:
 
<F, 7 > > 
For each combination of a detection vector and a diagnosis vector, one
 
can find all the possible combinations of commands that are issued to
 
the switches:
 
<F, T, r>------->s) 
Then, it is quite simple to find the system configuration from the
 
switch vector and the failure states of the switches:
 
Thus, one can find all the possible configuration that a failure pattern
 
can induce on the system. The condition for a static state to be
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consistent is that the system configuration, the R vector, can be the
 
result of at least one fault-pattern.
 
IV.6.3 Characterization of the Critical Failure-Patterns
 
A critical fault-pattern is one that leaves the system in a critical
 
static state. One can characterize fault-patterns by the detection,
 
diagnosisa nd switch vectors associated with each individual failures.
 
This provides all the information relating to the detection, diagnosis
 
and isolation of every individual failure in the pattern. In general, a
 
critical fault-pattern will be listed as:
 
o 1 dFC > <F.. -- L-> > <Fx, R > = <F , R >d 1 dF dF 
T, 
+ 
T2 Tx
 
S, S2
 
$i S2 Sx
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IV.7 A Method to List All the Failure-Patterns with a Given Criticality
 
Starting from the enumeration of the critical states with a given
 
criticality, the enumeration of the corresponding critical
 
fault-patterns can implemented as a computer program.
 
IV.7.1 First Step
 
The first step consists in listing all the possible fault-patterns that
 
correspond to a given failure configuration. The failure configuration,
 
F, that should be considered first are those which are part of the most
 
critical static states. The list of fault-patterns that correspond to a
 
given failure configuration F, depends upon what is considered an
 
individual failure (whether individual failures affect only one unit or
 
more). The fault-patterns that correspond to a given failure
 
configuration will be called potentially critical.
 
IV.7.2 Second Step
 
The first part is to find all the fault-detection mechanisms (whether
 
hardware or software).
 
For each fault-detection mechanism, one needs to list all the units for
 
which detection is possible. This gives the matrix N.
 
It is also required to find whether there are detection mechanisms that
 
can achieve perfect detection. In general, only the mechanisms that use
 
cross-channel comparison can achieve perfect detection. For each one of
 
them, one should also find under which conditions perfect detection is
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achieved.
 
For each fault detection mechanism, one needs to find all the channel
 
units that are used to perform the detection (the matrix M).
 
Then, for each individual failure in a potentially critical
 
fault-pattern, one needs to list all the possible detection vectors.
 
This produces the list of detection vectors associated with a
 
potentially critical failure.
 
IV.7.3 Third Step
 
The first part is to find all the mechanisms that are used to perform
 
diagnosis (either local or global).
 
For each diagnosis mechanism, one needs to find which error indications
 
trigger the diagnosis process and which is the diagnosis algorithm.
 
For each diagnosis mechanism, it is necessary to find all the system
 
units that are used to implement this mechanism. This gives the matrix
 
N'.
 
For each diagnosis mechanism, one needs to find all the possible
 
diagnosis vectors that can be produced as a result of the detection
 
vectors found in step 2.
 
IV.7.4 Fourth Step
 
The first part is to find how switches are controlled. For the switches
 
that are controlled directly by the diagnosis mechanisms,,one must find
 
wnat commands are issued for each diagnosis vector found in step 3.
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For the switches that are controlled through control mechanism, one
 
needs to find the inputs, outputs and function of such mechanisms.
 
For every switch control mechanism, it is necessary to find which units
 
are used to implement their function. This wi-l-l give the matrix M".
 
For every combination of detection and, diagnosis vectors that is 
produced by step 2 and 3, one needs to find all the possible 
combinations of commands sent, to the switches. This, with the first 
part of step 4, will give all the possible switch vectors.
 
IV.7.5 Fifth Step
 
Given the switch vector and the system failure configuration, one can
 
find the system configuration. If a potentially critical failure
 
pattern (along with its detection, diagnosis and. switch vectors) does
 
not drive the system in a critical static state, then this
 
fault-pattern is not critical (consistency operation).
 
This fifth step yields all the fault-patterns with their detection,
 
diagnosis and switch vectors that drive the system from an initial
 
fault-free state to a critical static state (cf. Fig. i0).
 
One should note that this procedure to enumerate the critical
 
fault-patterns seems to involve much computation. However, since we
 
are principally interested in the system tolerance to the first few
 
failures, the total number of all the possible combinations of
 
detection, diagnosis and switch vectors will be quite manageable.
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Fig. 10. Cri.tical fault-patterns for a critical state.
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V. CURRENT AND FUTURE RESEARCH
 
V.1. Computer Program for Enumerating the Critical Fault-Patterns
 
We are presently looking at the problems posed by a computer
 
implementation of sections III. and IV. One of the major criteria is
 
generality. Such a program should be applicable to any highly redundant
 
computer system. For this reason, an interactive approach seems more
 
appropriate.
 
The problem of computation complexity needs also to be carefully
 
considered. Enumeration of the static states with a given criticality
 
will be a fairly simple task since we are principally interested with
 
the system tolerance to the first few failures. It is highly likely
 
that most of the computations will take place when listing all the
 
possible detection, diagnosis and switch vectors for each of the
 
individual failures that are part of the potentially critical
 
fault-patterns. Some reduction in the computation can be obtained by
 
using the symmetry between channels. Another method to reduce the
 
computation complexity is to eliminate some of the potentially critical
 
static states before analysing each of the corresponding fault-patterns.
 
For example, it is possible to eliminate some potentially critical
 
system states by noting that some failures can never induce certain
 
reconfiguration actions. Thus, a preliminary gross analysis of the
 
range of possible effects for failures will significantly reduces the
 
nunber of fault-patterns that need to be analyzed.
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Another problem that is currently under study relates to the diagnosis
 
algorithms. Such diagnosis algorithms are substantial pieces of
 
software. In the case of ARCS, the diagnosis process following an error
 
indication in provenance of the cross-channel output monitors is fairly
 
complex since it may lasts several time frames and involves
 
cross-channel communication. One possibility is to allow the program
 
for critical fault-pattern enumeration to use the actual system
 
diagnosis software as a subroutine. This way, the need to model the
 
diagnosis process (and the corresponding loss of accuracy) is bypassed
 
completely. However, unless the diagnosis software is available in a
 
high level language, this will require to write a simulator.
 
The end goal of this enumeration program is to list all the
 
fault-patterns, with their detection, diagnosis and switch vectors, that
 
take the system from an initial fault-free state to a critical state
 
(cf. Fig. 10). This will already provide a simple way to relate the
 
system coverage to the first few failures to the efficiency of the
 
fault-detection mechanisms, since we can list which of the undetected
 
failures will cause a system crash. However, far more accurate system
 
evaluation can be made if one can map the critical fault-patterns (as
 
described by their detection, diagnosis and switch vectors) onto the
 
physical hardware failures (for example line x stuck-at-one, ...).
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V.2 Mapping Between Critical Fault-Patterns and Hardware Failures
 
We are presently investigating how to find all the hardware failue
 
(described for example as line x stuck-at-one) which correspond to a
 
given critical fault-pattetn.
 
V.2.1 First Approach: Simulation
 
The first approach under consideration is to use a fault simulator. The
 
enumeration program will provide the list of the most critical
 
fault-patterns. Each individual failure in these critical
 
fault-patterns is characterized by its locatioh (at the unit level),
 
detection, diagnosis and switch vectors. Thus, one can easily list the
 
subset of the system units where a failure can correspond to the first
 
individual failure of one of the most critical fault-patterns. Then,
 
one can simulate each one of these units. The simulation should include
 
the possibility to establish whether failures are detected. The
 
simulation can be either a gate level simulation, if one wishes to
 
characterize the faults down to the gate inputs and outputs, or a higher
 
level simulation (for example at the I.C. chip level). Many such
 
fault-simulators have been developed in relation to test generation and
 
some are commercially available (H.P. TESTAID system for example).
 
If the unit that is simulated is provided with some hardware
 
fault-detection mechanism, the simulation will also provide the list of
 
failures that are not detected. If the unit is tested throught software
 
tests (for example the processor is tested by the test routines), then,
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we can run the softare tests on the simulated unit. This way, one can
 
get a list of all the failures that will have a detection vector that
 
matches the detection vector specified in the characteristics of the
 
critical fault-patterns.
 
If a failure has the detection vector specified in the *fault-pattern
 
characteristics, then one needs to look at the diagnosis and switch
 
control processes. If the unit that performs the diagnosis is
 
fault-free, then one can run the diagnosis program for this particular
 
detection vector and find out whether the failure is correctly
 
diagnosed. If the diagnosis mechanism is itself affected by the failure
 
(for example if the failure is in the processor), then, one needs to run
 
the diagnosis program on the faulty machine. This can also be done with
 
the simulator. Similarly, one can also simulate the switch control
 
process and decide whether a particular failure has diagnosis and switch
 
vectors that match those specified in the fault-pdttern characteristic.
 
This will yield the list of all the failures in a particular unit that
 
correspond to the first individual failure of a critical fault-pattern.
 
Then, one can use the same method to find all the failures that
 
constitute the second individual failure of the fault-pattern.
 
This method may require a substantial amount of computation since it
 
involves using a fault simulator. It is commonly assumed that a
 
software implemented simulator runs about a thousand time slower than
 
the actual hardware. However, it is believed that this approach is
 
still a valid one. First, one will have to simulate only some of the
 
units, and never the complete system (at the most, it will require
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simulating one channel). Secondly, since the systems under
 
consideration are highly reliable, it is likely that there will be only
 
a few failures that will satisfy the conditions specified in the
 
fault-pattern characteristics. Thus, when looking for the second
 
individual failures of the fault-patterns, one will have only a very
 
limited number of first failures to consider. One should also note that
 
this approach is far more efficient that a straightforward method that
 
would ignore completely the enumeration of the critical fault-patterns
 
and simulate directly the system behavior for every single, double, and
 
even triple failures.
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V.2.2 Second Approach: Analysis of the Detection Process
 
One of the major problems with simulation is that it is necessary to
 
simulate all the faults in order to find which ones are not detected. A
 
different approach, that is currently under study, will avoid such a
 
complete enumeration of all the failures.
 
This approach is based upon the observation that detection can be
 
achieved either through hardware mechanisms (parity, encoding) or
 
throught test sets. A hardware detection fault-detection mechanism will
 
yield an error indication if the circuit cuputs invalidate a certain
 
condition (fig. 11). For example, a parity checker will trip if the
 
values on the circuit outputs do not sum up to zero (mod. 2).
 
Similarly, a test set will indicate a failure if the circuit output
 
values, for the inputs specified in the test set, do not match the
 
correct values. So, in both cases, an error indication will -be
 
generated if some boolean conditions are not satisfied. Failures escape
 
detection if the faulty circuits still satisfy the conditions but yet,
 
they produce erroneous outputs. For example, one can state the boolean
 
conditions that must be satisfied for a failure to escape detection by
 
the parity checker for the circuit of Fig. 11:
 
let X represent the input vector,
 
let z1 , z2 , z3 and z4 be the circuit outputs when it is fault-free,
 
let z'1, z'2, Z?3 and z'4 be the circuit outputs when it is faulty,
 
then, the conditions for a failure to go undetected are:
 
z I1 Z'2 e Z'3 q z'4 = 0 for every value of X,
 
and there exist X such that
 
(z 1 z'1) + (z2 e z'2 ) + (z3 z'3 ) + (z4 9 z'
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Fig. 11. Example of a circuit with parity checker.
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For combinational circuits, one can express the circuit faulty behavior
 
(the output functions) as a function of the fault-free functions and the
 
faults if one replaces every line by an AND and OR gates to take into
 
account the fact that the 'line can be fault-free, .stuck-at-one or,
 
stuck-at-zero. Fig. 12 gives an example of such a transformation.-

Thus, the functions z' can be expressed as functions of the fault:
 
z' = z'(X, F)
 
with F = <f1' f2' .... I fk>
 
f. = 00 if line i is fault-free,1 
f. = 01 if line i is stuck-at-one,1 
f. = 10 if line i is stuck-at-zero.1 
Such a description of the faults allows the use of boolean manipulations
 
to find the faults that escape detection (for which the circuit does not
 
satisfy the detection conditions). The problem is analogous to solving
 
a boolean expression, since failures can be represented as extra inputs
 
to the circuit.
 
We are presently studying the relations between the faults with respect
 
to detection. This will allows to reduce significantly the
 
computations. We are also investigating methods to scan circuits for
 
the faults that escape detection. The end goal is to be able to list
 
all the failures that escape detection with a single scanning of the
 
circuit. This involves studying the propagation of the detection
 
conditions throught the circuit.
 
In a parallel effort, we are trying to obtain a very fine partitionning
 
of the units in terms of subunits which would be quite independent with
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Fig. 12-a. Transformation of a line to reflect possible line failures.
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Fig. 12cb. Example of a circuit.
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Fig. 12. Circuit transformation to take into effect possible failures.
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respect to failure detection. This will decrease significantly the
 
complexity of the circuits for which one needs to find the undetected
 
failures.
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